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THE CASE FOR STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF
MANDATORY AGENCY DEADLINES UNDER SECTION 706(1)
Administrative law is a complex field replete with regulations
and delicate separation of powers issues. Indeed, "[aldministrative
law is not for sissies . . . ."' The various factors at play in
administrative law make the seemingly most elementary facets
hard to understand.
The problems in administrative law are amplified by the role of
politics. Administrative law influences the way agencies make
policy.2 Agencies are thus among the most important players in the
formation and approval of policy.' Although the most obvious ways
that agencies make policy are through positive rulemaking and
adjudication measures,4 agencies also set policy through inaction.'
Agencies often set policy by not doing anything at all.6 When an
agency does not make the requisite regulations through either
rulemaking or adjudication, the agency maintains the status quo.
This inaction is thus itself a form of policymaking in the sense
that it prevents the legislative and executive branches from
1. Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DuxE L. J. 511, 511.
2. See RICHARD J. PIRCE ETAL., ADImmIISTRATIVE LAWAND PROCESS § 2.5.1, at 34 (2d
ed. 1992).
3. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 1.2, at 6 (2d ed.

1997) (noting that [s]etting policy is the most important function assigned to agencies").
4. Although the specifics of rulemaking and adjudication are beyond the scope of this
Note, it is important to have a rudimentary understanding of the differences between the
methods. Rulemaking is a process in which agencies undergo either formal or informal
processes where they make regulations that are binding on future parties, allowing the
agencies to create rules before actually enforcing them. See id. 4.1 at 317 (discussing how
rulemaking occurs); see also BREYERETAL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAWAND REGULAToRYPOLICY:

PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES at 568-76 (4th ed. 1999) (comparing rulemaking and
adjudication). The other positive route to create policy is through adjudication, which is a
trial-like proceeding in which the policies are set after a violation has occurred. See KOCH,
supranote 3, § 5.1 at 3. Both methods are positive measures in the sense that they create
rules and policies to be followed.
5. See BREYERETAL., supranote 4, at 861 (noting that "the government is always acting
... even if the particular agency appears to be sitting on its hands").
6. See id.
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implementing enacted legislation. Congress needs the agencies to
carry out its laws by passing specific rules. Otherwise, congressional mandates are thwarted.
In an effort to ensure that agencies implement enacted
legislation, Congress mandated judicial review of agency inaction
and delay in section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).7 Section 706(1) enables the judiciary to review agency
behavior and ensure that it comports with the statutory
requirements set forth by Congress either in the enabling statute
or in the default standards of the APA.
Recent decisions out of the Tenth Circuit' have invigorated the
debate over the role of agency inaction in agency policymaking
decisions. Although some courts have encouraged judicial discretion
when determining whether agency inaction is unlawful,' other
courts have found that the language in section 706(1) is strictly
binding in the area of statutorily imposed deadlines.'0 Circuit courts
are now split over whether courts have discretion when an agency
misses a mandatory deadline or if they are mandated by law to
force the agency to act without granting discretion to agency
priorities.1
This Note explores the problems of agency inaction and delay in
violation of statutory requirements. First, this Note discusses the
legislative history of section 706(1) to determine congressional
intent. Second, this Note examines the conflicting cases that fuel
7. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994).

8. See Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding a strict
statutory construction of section 706(1)); see alsoYu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922 (10th Cir.
1999) (agreeing with ForestGuardiansin finding a strict requirement to force agencies to act
under certain circumstances).
9. See, e.g., In re Barr Lab., Inc., 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
10. Section 706(1) requires the court to compel agency action when the agency has
unlawfully withheld action, which, as discussed below, includes missing statutorily imposed
deadlines.
11. A circuit split has developed concerning the interpretation of section 706(1). The
District of Columbia Circuit uses a balancing technique to determine whether a court should
compel an agency to act when it misses a statutory deadline. See In re Barr Lab., Inc., 930
F.2d at 72; Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, have held
that the courts have no discretion when an agency misses a deadline because such inaction
constitutes "unlawfully withheld" conduct. See Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178
(10th Cir. 1999); Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the confusion over the appropriate remedy for agency inaction.
Finally, this Note concludes that section 706(1) requires strict
statutory construction that requires judges to prohibit agencies
from violating a mandatory statutory deadline unless the agency
has an impossibility defense. As a result, although agencies are
important policymaking entities, they must respect congressional
intent evident in blatant statutory deadlines. When agencies do not
abide by congressional mandates, courts must require immediate
action in compliance with the law.
BACKGROUND: THE STATUTE AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The APA granted judicial review of agency behavior in section
706.2 Although section 706 as a whole grants judicial review,

12. The statute reads as follows:
§ 706. Scope of Review.
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions oflaw, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonablydelayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found
to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
ofstatutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
(F)unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial
de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those
parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. 5
U.S.C. §706 (emphasis added).
The APA was enacted as a compromise over the new regulations installed as part of the
New Deal Many politicians disagreedwith the politics ofthe New Deal and wanted to ensure
judicial review ofagencydecisions while others wanted agency autonomy. See BEYEREETAL.,
supranote 4, at 19-24. The APA acted as a compromise in which agencies were regulated
while still maintaining considerable discretion in their decision-making capacity. See id. at
19-24 for a discussion of the reasons behind the Act.
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section 706(1) specifically addresses the issue of agency inaction.'3
On its face, the statute is extremely clear. Section 706(1) states that
a court shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed." 4 Although this language is strong and does
not appear to leave anything open for debate, courts disagree over
whether Congress intended to allow any room for discretion. 5
Legislative History
The legislative history of the APA supports the idea that
Congress intended courts to force agencies to implement legislation.
One basis for this support is the Senate Judiciary Committee report
of May 1945 that discussed the upcoming APA.'6 This report
contained earlier versions of the APA that had the same language
requiring the judiciary to force agency action when it was
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. 7 The Senate report
noted that the authority granted to the judiciary under the judicial
review clause did not allow the courts to strip agencies of discretion
in determining how an agency should carry out legislation.' 8
Rather, the Senate simply wanted the court to direct the agency to
act without dictating what process the agency should use.'9
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report on S.7, A Bill to
Improve the Administration of Justice by Prescribing Fair
Administrative Procedures,20 which was made public on November
19, 1945, also discussed the aims behind the Act. This report
discussed the ability of interested parties to petition the court to
13. See id.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
15. The debate about the language in section 706(1) has primarily focused around
"unreasonably delayed." See infra notes 63-106 and accompanying text. This Note, however,
argues that the correct language to apply is "ulawfully withheld." See infra notes 174-75
and accompanying text.
16. See STAFF OF SENATE ON THE JUDICIARY COMM., 79th CoNG., (Comm. Print 1945),
reprintedin ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, at 11 (1997)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

17. See id. at 39 (noting that an earlier version of the Act also contained the language
that "[the courts] shall . .. compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed").
18. See id. at 40.
19. See id.
20. See LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 213-14.
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force agency action. 1 Thus, this second report identified the
problem of agencies not abiding by congressional guidelines.
Congress wanted to fix this problem by allowing courts to force the
agencies to listen to their mandates.
The Attorney General's Interpretation2 2 also discussed the
passage of the judicial review clause of the APA. This report stated
that the precursor to section 706(1) contained the entire scope of
judicial review.' Although the report noted that Congress was not
granting the courts any nonjudicial powers, it did explicitly state
that the purpose of the bill was to give the courts a tool with which
24
they could force the agency to act according to congressional will.
The Attorney General's Interpretation thus supports the
proposition that courts should compel agencies to act without
exercising any discretion.
Finally, the House Committee Proceedings help to determine the
purpose behind the APA.' The House of Representatives noted that
the APA delegated the ability to decide issues of law to the
judiciary.2" Furthermore, the statute enabled people to petition
courts to force agencies to act when "they improvidently refuse to
act." 7 The House proceedings also noted that the Act was intended
to speed up the process of requiring agencies to act when Congress
so desired." When the House focused on compelling agencies to act
when they "improvidently" refused to do so, it endorsed the idea
that agencies should not be able to ignore congressional mandates.
Although the House Committee Proceedings did not explicitly
mention statutory deadlines, it does support the underlying idea of
compelling agencies to observe congressional will.
The legislative history of the APA thus demonstrates that
Congress was intent on finding a way to force the agencies to
21. See id. at 214 (noting that the provision "expressly recognizes the right of properly
interested parties to compel agencies to act where they improvidently refuse to act").
22. See id- at 230.
23. See i&.
24. See id. (defining what the Attorney General believes to be the purpose of the Act).
25. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote 16, at 278.
26. See id- (noting that courts are exclusively able to decide questions of law).

27. Id.
28. See id. (noting that the language stating that a court shalU compel an agency to act
is in response to instances when there is "a withholding or a long delay, and that particular
feature isintended to hasten action on the part of these agencies").
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comply with legislation. Congress was concerned about lengthy
delays resulting in a circumvention of legislation and intended
section 706(1) to remedy the situation.2 9 The legislative history
makes it clear that Congress intended for the judiciary to use the
Act to ensure that its policies were fully implemented by agencies.
The Attorney General'sManual on the APA0
Aside from congressional records, the Attorney General's Manual
is one of the most comprehensive and respected reports on the
APA. 1 The Manual provided an explanation of the Act to be
followed by the Justice Department. The Manual noted that the
APA's section on judicial review is a "restatement of [the] existing
judicial practice" 2 of mandamus" inthe area of agency inaction and
delay. 4 Courts are not allowed to substitute their own discretion
for agency discretion35 when forcing the agency to act on
congressional mandates.
The Attorney General's Manual compared the APA to mandamus
and noted that "[o]rders in the nature of a writ of mandamus have
been employed to compel an administrative agency to act.., or to
compel an administrative agency or officer to perform a ministerial
29. See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
30. U.S.DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICE,ATORNEYGENERAL'SMANUALONTHEADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AcT (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].
31. The ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL has been cited by the Supreme Court and is an
authoritative source on the meaning of the APA. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,546 (1978).
32. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supranote 30, at 108.
33. Mandamus is a process in which courts compel agencies to execute their obligations.
See KOCH, supra note 3, § 8.20(4) at 465. Writs of mandamus are restricted to forcing an
agency to carry out their duties, and are not available to strip an agency ofits discretion in
its method of carrying out the duty. See id. at 466.
34. For an in-depth analysis of mandamus and its relationship to section 706(1), see
Carol R. Miaskoff, Note: JudicialReview ofAgency Delay and Inactionunder Section 706(1)
oftheAdministrativeProcedureAct,55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 635 (1987). Miaskoffargues that
section 706(1) acts as a writ ofmandamus. She further discusses the implications of viewing
section 706(1) as mandamus and traces the cases involving agency delay until the time of her
publication in 1987. There has been much change since Miaskofi's work that willbe reflected
in this Note. Although Miaskoffpredicted some trends in agency inaction and delay cases,
a split has developed in the circuits that she was unable to address.
35. See ATTORNEYGENERAL'S MANUAL, supranote 30, at 108 (noting that the agency still
has discretion in determining how to carry out its administrative duties).
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or non-discretionary act. [The judicial review provision] was
apparently intended to codify these judicial functions." 6 This
reference to mandamus illustrates how the judicial review provision
works.
The Manual used two cases, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brown"7 and
InterstateCommerce Commission v. UnitedStates ofAmerica ex. rel
Humboldt Steamship Co.,"8 to discuss the APA's relationship to
mandamus. In Humboldt, the Court noted that parties could
petition the Court for mandamus in order to compel an agency to
act. 9 The case revolved around whether Alaska, not yet a state, fell
under the definition of a territory under an act requiring railroads
to post schedules.' Mandamus was commonly used to direct
officials to act without controlling the discretion of the officials. 4 '
The Court noted that "if [the official or agency] absolutely refuse[s]
to act, den[ies] its power, from a misunderstanding of the law, it
cannot be said to exercise discretion."4 2 Mandamus could thus be
used to force an administrative official to act without stripping the
agency of discretion. Humboldt is important because it allowed the
courts to have jurisdiction over agencies and to compel them to act
when Congress had so required.4" Therefore, the Attorney General's
Manual suggests that the judiciary does have jurisdiction to compel
agencies to act as long as they do not strip them of their discretion
in the manner in which agencies carry out congressional demands.
The second case that the Attorney General's Manual discussed is
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brown. This case was decided close in time
to the debate over the new APA. Although the court did not grant
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
138 F.2d 278 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943).
224 U.S. 474 (1912).
See id.
See id at 480-82.
See id. at 484.
Id.
See id. at 485:
In the case at bar the Commission refused to proceed at all, though the law
required it to do so; and to so do as required-that is, to take jurisdiction, not in
what manner to exercise it-is the effect of the decree ofthe Court of Appeals,
the order of the court being that a peremptory writ of mandamus be issued
directing the Commission "to take jurisdiction ofsaid cause and proceed therein
as by law required."
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relief in this case, it did indicate that if the party had requested a
writ of mandamus, it would have provided relief." Safeway Stores
is important in understanding the APA because it demonstrates
that Congress recognized a clear need for a mandamus-type action
for the courts in agency inaction cases. Congress wanted to ensure
that there was a remedy for agency inaction and to give parties
access to a remedy.
The Attorney General's Manual provides insight into the basis for
the APA. It, along with the relevant case law, makes clear that
Congress intended to create a cause of action for interested parties
to petition the court to compel agency action. This cause of action
is similar to the common law writ of mandamus 45 and is a solid
method to ensure that agencies follow congressional will.
HECKLER V. CHANEY: THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS ON AGENCY
DISCRETION IN INACTION CASES

The preeminent case concerning agency discretion in inaction is
Heckler v. Chaney.46 In Heckler,the Supreme Court held that there
is a presumption ofunreviewability when agencies decide not to act
or enforce legislation "unless Congress has indicated otherwise."'
This case demonstrates the rationale behind giving agencies
discretion and discussed when there is "law to apply" that would
negate agency discretion.
The unlikely source for Heckler was a suit by several death row
inmates challenging the legality of lethal injection drugs." The
44. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 138 F.2d 278,280 (Emer. Ct. App. 1945) (noting

that there must be a remedy to agency inaction and that the writ of mandamus is capable
of allowing the court to compel such action).
45. See Miaskoff, supra note 34 (discussing the similarities between section 706(1) and

the writ of mandamus).
46. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Heckler v. Chaney presents an intricate analysis beyond the

scope of this Note. For a more complete evaluation of the case, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CI. L. REV. 653 (1985). Heckler
has also spawned numerous student notes. See, e.g., William W. Templeton, Note, Heckler
v. Chaney: The New Presumption ofNonreviewability ofAgency Enforcement Decisions,35
CATH. U.L. REV. 1099 (1986); Sharon Werner, Note, The Impact of Heckler v. Chaney on
JudicialReview ofAgency Decisions,86 COLUM. L. REV. 1247 (1986).
47. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838.
48. See id. at 823.
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prisoners brought suit against the FDA, claiming that the drugs
used for lethal injection were never tested for such a purpose and
that the drugs were "mislabeled" in that there were no warnings or
instructions on how to use the drugs in order to achieve a painless
lethal injection.49 The prisoners claimed that because the FDA had
not sufficiently investigated and tested the drugs for the purpose of
lethal injection, the Court had to compel more investigation before
allowing the drugs to be used in such a manner."
The statute upon which the prisoners relied stated that "[tihe
Secretary is authorizedto conduct examinations and investigations"
into, among other things, the current drugs used for lethal
injection.5 Although the Court agreed that the FDA did have the
discretion to investigate the use of the drugs, it claimed that there
was "no law to apply" because there was no statement of when the
Secretary should examine a drug situation.52 Furthermore,
although the statute stated that the Secretary need not investigate
minor problems, it also did not mandate an investigation of all
major problems.53
The Court concluded that it should not review agency decisions
not to act unless there is specific law to apply demonstrating that
Congress intended to strip the agency of discretion.54 The agency
should usually be given discretion because of its expertise, ability
to view priorities as a whole,55 and the history of prosecutorial
discretion,56 unless explicitly negated by Congress. This ruling
boosts agency discretion in their decisions to enforce regulation.
49. See id. at 824-25 (describing the nature of the claims).
50. See id. at 823.
51. I. at 835 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. See a at 837.
54. See id. at 830 (noting that "even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded
review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise ofdiscretion").
55. See id.at 831 (discussing the importance of agency expertise and its ability to weigh
competing regulations to determine which to act on first).
56. See id- at 827 (recognizing the dissenting judge's opinion in the lower court which
placed importance on such prosecutorial discretion); see also id. at 831 (noting that "ft]his
Court has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to an agency's absolute discretion").
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Although the Heckler decision is beneficial to agency discretion,
it can be overcome because it is a rebuttable presumption and not
complete prohibition.57 The Court held that Congress can limit an
agency's discretion through setting priorities or legislating how an
agency should handle their cases. 8 The use of deadlines falls under
such limits.59 Therefore, the presumption of unreviewability of
agency decisions not to act is far from absolute. When Congress
explicitly gives the agency deadlines, the agency must comply
because there is "law to apply."
THE CURRENT STATE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The past several decades have seen much judicial review of
agency inaction and delay. Although the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia has allowed agency discretion in the face of
blatant violations of a statutory deadline, 0 the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have recently decided that ifthere is a mandatory deadline,
the agency must abide by it.61 In fact, the Tenth Circuit has held
that an agency's tardiness in the face of a statutory deadline is per
se a violation of section 706(1).62

The Case for JudicialDiscretion in the Face of Statutory
Deadlines: The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Districtof
Columbia
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
forged a jurisprudence that grants agencies broad discretion, even
in the face of statutory deadlines. The circuit has repeatedly ruled
that statutory deadlines are not dispositive, but are only one factor
57. See id. at 832-33 (discussing how a party can overcome the presumption of
unreviewability).
58. See id. at 833.
59. Mandating time specific deadlines is a form ofsetting priorities which can reasonably
negate the rebuttable presumption of agency discretion.
60. See In re Barr Lab., Inc., 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
61. See e.g. Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that
statutory deadlines must be observed by the agency); Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt,
73 F.3d 867 (9th Cir.1995).
62. See ForestGuardians,174 F.3d at 1191.
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to balance when determining whether the court should compel
agency action.
Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. Federal
Communications Commission: The Creationof the Balancing
Approach
The most prominent case dealing with agency delay and inaction
in the District of Columbia Circuit is TelecommunicationsResearch
and Action Center v. Federal Communications Commission63
(TRAC). TRAC dealt with the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and its regulation of long distance phone companies. 64 The
FCC promulgated a regulation that long distance phone companies,
including AT&T, could not have profits that exceeded 10% of their
revenues. 65 When petitioners noted that AT&T's profits exceeded
the 10% maximum, they petitioned the FCC to investigate. 6
Although the FCC did institute notice and comment proceedings, it
did not resolve the situation over a five-year time period.6"
Petitioners then filed a cause of action to force the agency to act and
investigate AT&T.68 The FCC claimed that ithad a staffing problem
which it would soon remedy.69 The FCC, however, never did
anything to address the problem. The petitioner thus filed an
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of
mandamus that would require the FCC to act.70
The court addressed two main issues in the case. First, the court
stated that it needed to determine whether it had jurisdiction to
compel agency action in a case of unreasonable delay.7 ' The All
Writs Act 72 gave the" Court of Appeals jurisdiction over
63. 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

64. See id. at 73.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 73.
68. See id.

69. See id.

70. See id. at 72.
71. See id. at 74-79 (discussing the issue ofjurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal).

72. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1995). The All Writs Act grants jurisdiction to federal appellate
courts to deal with claims of unreasonable agency delay. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 75.
Furthermore, the AllWritsAct provides that"[t]he Supreme Court and an courts established
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"unreasonable Commission delay.""3 The court noted that a lack of
final judgment in the case did not preclude court action in the
matter.74 Furthermore, the court found jurisdiction because Courts
of Appeal have traditionally issued writs of mandamus.75 Appellate
courts are particularly well situated to compel agency action
because they are more experienced with administrative law than
are district courts and are able to provide uniformity and efficiency
in issuing such orders."6
Second, the court questioned whether issuing a writ of
mandamus was the proper method to compel an agency to act when
the agency had refused to do so for an unreasonably long period of
time.77 Congress intended that agencies should act within a
reasonable time and that courts should play an important role in
compelling agencies to act.78 Mandamus is a remedy that is to be
used only when there are no other options.79 The court noted that
although there are reasons to allow agency discretion, such as
agency expertise and the importance of a record, 0 the benefits of
the agency do not exist when the agency does not act at all."
Therefore, the court found that mandamus is applicable in cases
where agencies have been unreasonably delayed.
The court formulated a six-part test to determine if an agency
unreasonably delayed implementation of congressional mandates.
First, the court noted that the time agencies take to make decisions
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
73. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 75.
74. See id. (finding that lack of final judgment "does not automatically preclude ...
jurisdiction").
75. See id. at 76 (noting that the All Writs Act allows mandamus); see also id. at 76 n.28
("The Supreme Court has long recognized the authority of appellate courts to compel district
court action through mandamus."). Congress designated appellate courts to have exclusive
jurisdiction over compelling agency action. See id. at 77 (noting that "[bly lodging review of
agency action in the Court of.Appeals, Congress manifested an intent that the appellate court
exercise sole jurisdiction over the class of claims covered by the statutory grant of review
power").
76. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 78 (explaining the policy reasons for appellate court review).
77. See id. at 79-81.
78. See id. at 77 (noting that section 555(b) combined with section 706(1) indicates
congressional intent that courts be responsible for this area).
79. See id. at 78 (noting that mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy").
80. See id. at 79.
81. See id.
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is governed -by a "rule of reason. 8 2 This rule of reason is a
reasonable amount of time that preserves the rights of the public
and economic opportunities without stripping due process rights."3
Second, where Congress legislated a speed at which the agency
84
should act, that is enough to be considered the rule of reason.
Third, delays involving human welfare are more important than
economic hardships and should thus be given more weight.8 5
Fourth, agency priorities should be considered when determining
if an agency unreasonably delays action. 6 Fifth, the court should
take into account the amount of damage produced by delay.8
Finally, there is no need to find bad faith or "impropriety" in order
to find that an agency was unreasonably delayed. 8
TRAC addressed agency inaction when there was no statutory
deadline. Although the D.C. Circuit has relied on the six-part test
in TRAC for both delay and violation of deadlines, the test
specifically says that Congress can legislate a timetable in the
second step. Therefore, the use of TRAC's balancing factors in cases
where there are actual statutory deadlines is puzzling. The mere
presence of a deadline seems to satisfy the test, noting that there is
no "rule of reason" involved. The first two factors involving the rule
of reason test appear to be the most important factors of the test,
yet later decisions have held that even if an agency violated a
statutory deadline, the court still must indulge in a balancing of the
other four TRAC factors.8 9
In re Barr Laboratories: Continuingthe Balance
One case that used the balancing factors, even in the face of a
statutory deadline, is In re BarrLaboratories,Inc.9 Barrheld that
even when an agency blatantly violates a mandatory statutory
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 80.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See In re Barr Lab., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74-75 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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deadline, the court still needs to balance the TRAC factors to
determine whether the agency unreasonably delayed its required
action." Barrinvolved a case in which the FDA violated a statutory
deadline to decide whether to approve a generic form of a drug.92
The FDA was required to approve an application for a drug within
one hundred eighty days of the initial receipt, or if there was a
"major" amendment to the application, the FDA had an additional
one hundred eighty days. The FDA admittedly missed the
deadline to act on the application but claimed that it should be
excused due to a labor shortage.9 The FDA further admitted that
without an order compelling 9action, future delays would be at least
double then-existing delays.
Although the court candidly noted that the "FDA's sluggish pace
violates the statutory deadline,"96 it nonetheless ruled it
inappropriate to grant relief by compelling the agency to act.
Compelling the agency to act would simply make other deserving
candidates wait longer and would not benefit society. 8 The court
thus decided to allow the agency some discretion even though it was
facing a mandatory statutory deadline.
In making its decision, the Barr court focused on the TRAC
factors even though there was a statutory deadline. The court
stated that step three of the TRAC test was important in this case
because generic drugs are not necessary for the welfare of the
public.99 The name brand version of the drugs was already available
and thus the generic brand was not a necessity." ° The court also
pointed out that the petitioner was concerned about commercial

91. See id. at 74-75.
92. See id. at 74 (describing how the FDAwas required to approve a drug within a certain

amount of time).
93. See id. (recognizingthe language of2l U.S.C. § 355(jX4)(A), which gives the timetable
for the drug application process).
94. See id.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id
Id. at 73.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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interests, which should not be granted as much weight as interests
affecting human welfare. 1 '
Barr focused on the policy behind allowing agency discretion in
this case. Agencies, the court held, are experts who are better
equipped to make decisions about priorities and that the court
should not "reorder" agency priorities. 10 2 The court put much
emphasis on the fact that agencies have expertise and are able to
balance the regulations and policies they must enforce. 10 Barrwas
concerned that the agency should not be forced by an unwitting
court to harm other projects that Congress authorized the agency
to oversee.
Barr thus performed a balancing analysis. While the court said
that statutory deadlines were not an absolute definition of
unreasonable delay, it also said that when an agency has singled
someone out in bad faith, it is unlikely to escape an order to compel
agency action. 104 Therefore, the court recognized that the TRAC
factors can be trumped by one issue: bad faith. This was not a factor
in TRAC, and yet was granted special status in Barr.
The court made it clear that it did not give preference to
statutory deadlines.' 5 Such deadlines were only one of several
factors to be balanced when determining if an agency had
unreasonably delayed its action. It is perplexing that the court used
the TRAC factors in the face of a statutory deadline; giving priority
to identifying agency policy instead of to the plain language of the
statute. Because the court used the TRAC factors, it apparently
considered the agency's violation of a statutory deadline as
"unreasonably delayed." By analyzing the agency's delinquency
under the rubric of "unreasonably delayed" instead of "unlawfully
withheld," the court was able to grant the agency more discretion.
Although the court used the TRAC analysis in an effort to grant the
101. See id.
102. See id at 75-76.
103. In fact, the court was quite emphatic when it stated that the "agency is in a
unique-and authoritative-position to view its projects as a whole, estimate the prospects
for each, and allocate its resources in the optimal way. Such budget flexibility as Congress
has allowed.., is not for us to hijack." Id. at 76.
104. See id. at 76.
105. See id. at 73 (stating that violation of statutory deadlines alone does not require a
court to compel agency action).
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agency more discretion, it disregarded the actual language of the
statutory deadline.
The Barr court's balancing analysis was inappropriate because
it did not address the fact that section 706(1) instructs courts to
compel an agency to act when the agency has "unlawfully withheld"
action. If the court had used the "unlawfully withheld" category, it
would be harder to allow agencies much discretion. Although the
"unlawfully withheld" category would limit agency discretion, it is
the more appropriate category when a mandatory statutory
deadline is an issue. When an agency misses a statutory deadline,
there is no ambiguity over whether the agency acted unreasonably.
By definition, acting unlawfully should be considered to be
unreasonable. There is thus no need for a balancing test, such as
the test promulgated in TRAC. As discussed below, the TRAC
factors should only be applied when agency action is unreasonably
delayed, not unlawfully withheld." 6 Agency inaction in the face of
a deadline should be classified as unlawfully withheld, not
unreasonably delayed, and thus not subject to the TRAC balancing
factors.
Over the past decade, the District of Columbia Circuit has
reinforced its position allowing agencies to take more time than
allowed by statute. In In re United Mine Workers of America
7 the court determined that the Mine Safety
InternationalUnion,""
and Health Administration should be allowed more time to
determine final regulations that would control diesel engine
exhaust in mines, even though the Administration had blatantly
missed its ninety-day deadline.'
The court noted that the
Administration was already working on other methods of reducing
exhaust and thus did not want to harm the administrative process.
The court relied on TRAC to demonstrate that violation of a
congressional timetable alone does not justify compelling an agency
to act.'0 9 Although the court ultimately retained jurisdiction over
the case until the Administration was able to come up with a

106.
107.
108.
109.

See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
190 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
See id. at 555-56.
See id. at 551.
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"reasonable" schedule to promulgate the regulations,"' it did not
find that the violation of the timetable alone was sufficient to
compel the Administration to act.
More recently, in Western Coal Traffic League v. Surface
TransportationBoard,"' the court determined that the Surface
Transportation Board was acting within its authority when it
created a fifteen-month moratorium on filing railroad merger
applications, even though the moratorium required the Board to
violate statutory timetables."' When the court determined that the
Board was authorized to violate the timetable, it cited In re Barrfor
the proposition that, regardless of deadlines, courts are not3
authorized to reorganize or "hijack7 agency priorities."
Furthermore, the court relied on TRAC and held that a statutory
timetable was only one of six factors and was not by itself
relied heavily on
dispositive." 4 As in earlier cases, the court again
115
cognizance."
"special
and
expertise
Board's
the
Through TRAC, In re Barr,and their progeny, the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbi'ahas developed ajurisprudence that does
not consider a missed statutory deadline as "unlawfully withheld."
Although the court's approach does grant agencies the discretion
that they arguably deserve because of their expertise, it does not
adequately consider the importance of statutory deadlines. The
court's approach is appropriate when Congress has not set specific
deadlines because an agency's expertise is an important asset. The
court's use of TRAC factors in the face of specific deadlines,
however, is not appropriate. When Congress specifically mandates
agency action by a particular date, the agency should not be allowed
to simply ignore congressional intent. Agencies should be required
to abide by congressional mandates, even if they are inconvenient.
If the deadlines are implausible, agencies must explore solutions
other than simply violating the law.

110. See id at 556.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

216 F.3d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1175-77.
See id at 1175.
See i&i at 1174.
Id. at 1176-77.
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The Case for Strict Statutory Constructionof Section 706(1)
Other circuits have determined that if an agency misses
mandatory statutory deadlines, there is no need for a balancing
test."6 These courts have decided that they have no discretion to
balance factors in such a situation because section 706(1) is clear.
This jurisprudence treats violations of statutory deadlines as
"unlawfully withheld" agency action as opposed to unreasonably
delayed action.1 "
Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of statutory deadlines in
Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt.' In Environmental
Defense Center,the court held that it could not compel agency action
because of a spending moratorium then in place. 9
At issue in the case was the failure of the Department of the
Interior to list the California red-legged frog as an endangered
species by its statutory deadline.'
The Department repeatedly
missed subsequent deadlines to act on the proposed rule to list the
frog.' After the Department missed the 1994 deadline, a spending
moratorium was passed on April 10, 1995.'
Petitioner, an
environmental group, filed suit to compel the Department to act
within a month after Congress instituted the moratorium.'
The Ninth Circuit decided that it could not compel the agency to
act in light of the then-present spending moratorium. 1 4 Although

116. See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 1999);
BiodiversityLegal Found. v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998); EnvironmentalDefense
Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1995).
117. See ForestGuardians,174 F.3d at 1191.
118. 73 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1995).
119. See id. at 869. Later courts interpreted the case as saying that, were it not for the
spending moratorium, the court would have compelled action and found that the agency
unlawfully withheld action. See ForestGuardians,174 F.3d at 1188.
120. See EnvironmentalDefense Ctr., 73 F.3d at 869.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 869.
124. See id.
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the court did not compel the agency to act,25 it stated that "the
[Environmental Defense Center] would prevail except for the fact
that between the time the Secretary failed to meet the deadline and
the time the [Environmental Defense Center] filed suit, Congress
passed an appropriations bill which precluded the expenditure.... '6 The moratorium thus did not strip the Department of
its duties, but instead temporarily excused the Secretary from
1
acting.
In Environmental Defense Center the Ninth Circuit clearly
implied that it would have found for the petitioner if it were not for
the moratorium. The court focused on the word "shall" and declared
that section 706(1) requires a "mandatory, nondiscretionary
duty." ' This is a strict statutory construction approach to section
706(1). The court made it clear that it did not have the discretion to
refuse to compel the action except in cases in which there is an
impossibility defense.2
The Ninth Circuit maintained jurisdiction of the case until the
moratorium ended.' Ten days after the moratorium was lifted, the
court held a hearing to determine what action to take.' The court
found that the Department needed to act immediately to list the
red-legged frog as endangered. The Department did so within
fourteen days of the hearing,' which suggests that there were few
problems in listing the frog as endangered.
With its holding in Environmental Defense Center, the Ninth
Circuit contradicted the D.C. Circuit's approach. Unlike the D.C.
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit placed more weight on the statutory
language of section 706(1) than on agency expertise. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the words of Congress superseded the
benefits of allowing an agency to decide how to handle its
administrative duties. Although agencies are in a particularly good
position to prioritize and execute congressional mandates because
125. See itLat 869-70.

126. I.
127. See id. at 871.
128. Id.
129. See id

130. See id. at 872.
131. See Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, CV-95-2867R (D.C. Cal. May 6,1996).
132. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1999).
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of expertise, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless realized that agency
expertise cannot trump the plain statutory language of section
706(1).
Biodiversity Legal Foundationv. Babbitt
The Tenth Circuit first addressed mandatory statutory deadlines
inBiodiversityLegal Foundationv. Babbitt. 3' InBiodiversityLegal
Foundation,the Tenth Circuit was faced with the Department of
the Interior's Listing Priority Guidance (LPG) system, which was
implemented after the congressional spending moratorium." 4 The
Department of the Interior created the LPG hierarchy of projects
because the moratorium created a backlog of cases.' The LPG
created new deadlines for the projects consistent with the new
priority system.' Although the LPG guidelines were consistent
with the agency's new priority system, they were not consistent
with previous congressional deadlines." 7
The petitioner in Biodiversity Legal Foundation filed suit to
require the Secretary to make a preliminary finding of whether the
Colombian sharp-tailed grouse was eligible for endangered species
status.' 3 The Secretary was required to make such a finding within
ninety days "to the maximum extent practicable."" 9 Once the
Secretary implemented the LPG system, the Department missed
the recommended ninety-day deadline."4
The court held that the LPG system, which basically preempted
congressional timing guidelines, was lawful.' 4 ' Furthermore, the
Endangered Species Act granted the Secretary broad discretion to
prioritize issues." 2 The court focused on the fact that there was no
mandatory deadline in this case because of the language "to the
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

146 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1251.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (citing the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(AX1994)).
See id.
See id. at 1257.
See id. at 1255-56.
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maximum extent practicable. " " There was thus no statutory

deadline to violate.
Biodiversity Legal Foundation declined to address what would
happen if the court were presented with an actual statutory
deadline.1 ' Although the court did not address this issue, it did
take a statutory construction approach to the deadline in this case.
This indicates that if an actual statutory deadline were in effect,
the court would hold that the LPG did violate congressional intent
and section 706(1).
ForestGuardiansv. Babbitt
One of the most recent cases to deal with statutory deadlines in
the Tenth Circuit was ForestGuardiansv. Babbitt,'5 a case decided
in April 1999. The Tenth Circuit, guided by precedent both in its
circuit and in the Ninth Circuit, defined as unlawful an agency's
delay of action beyond a mandatory deadline. 4
The petitioner was an environmental group concerned with the
lack of action on an endangered species called the silvery
minnow. 1 7 The Department of the Interior proposed the minnow as
an endangered species on March 1, 1993' and designated the fish
as an endangered species on July 20, 1994.149 The Secretary was
required to designate a critical habitat for the silvery minnow by
March 1995.150 The Department did not meet the March 1, 1995
143. Id. at 1253.
144. See id. at 1256 (noting that the LPG's validity in the face of a statutory deadline is
not at issue in the case).
145. 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999).
146. See id. at 1188-89, 1192 (citing Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867
(9th Cir. 1995)).
147. See id. at 1182.
148. See Proposed Rule to List the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow as Endangered, With [sic]
Critical Habitat, 58 Fed. Reg. 11,821, 11,822 (1993).
149. See Final Rule To [sic] List the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow as an Endangered
Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,988,36,995 (1994). This date already indicates that the Department
missed the first statutory deadline ofMarch 1,1994. See ForestGuardians,174 F.3d at 1182.
150. The Endangered Species Act requires the Secretary to designate a critical habitat for
endangered species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(bX6)(C) (1994). The deadline was noted as March
1, 1995. See Forest Guardians,174 F.3d at 1182 (noting that the Secretary was required to
designate a critical habitat for the silvery minnow within a year of the required date of its
designation as an endangered species if, as in this case, the Secretary deemed the critical
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deadline to designate a critical habitat for the silvery minnow and
had not designated such a habitat at the time of the lawsuit, nearly
four years after the deadline. 5 ' The court noted the importance of
the designation of a critical habitat for an endangered species in
order to avoid serious harm to the species.'52
The Secretary argued that it was fiscally impracticable to
designate a critical habitat for the silvery minnow. 5 3 Congress had
passed a spending moratorium prohibiting the Department from
expending funds on projects such as the designation of critical
habitats.'54 The moratorium, however, was passed in April 1995, a
month after the date of the deadline and was lifted in April 1996,
over a year before the Forest Guardians filed suit." Therefore, the
a
court found that it was possible for the Secretary to designate
156
critical habitat for the silvery minnow at the time of the suit.
Instead of designating a critical habitat for the silvery minnow,
even though the deadline was more than a year overdue, the
Secretary devised the LPG to determine new deadlines for a backlog
of Department projects resulting from the moratorium.I5 7 The LPG
instituted new deadlines that governed the listing of endangered
species and the designation of critical habitats based on perceived
importance. 8 The LPG program thus effectively stripped the
Endangered Species Act of the congressional force provided by
previously enacted mandatory statutory deadlines.
The court found that the Department violated the statutory
deadlines imposed by the Endangered Species Act.5 9 It noted that
the APA governs remedies available for parties petitioning for

habitat "not determinable" at the time of designation).
151. See Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1182 (noting that the Secretary still had not
designated a critical habitat at the time of the suit in 1999).
152. See id at 1185 (discussing the importance ofthe critical habitat in the preservation
of endangered species).
153. See id. at 1182.
154. See id. at 1182-88.
155. See id. at 1183-84 (discussing the duration of appropriations bills stripping the
Department of funding for certain projects).
156. See id. at 1193.
157. See id. at 1183.
158. See id. at 1184.
159. See id. at 1186.
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agency action.16 ° It also noted that section 706(1) states that
"Congress has stated unequivocally that courts must compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."16 1 The court
stated that it had no choice but to compel agency action if it is clear
from the statute and legislative history that Congress intended the
agency to act within a specific time frame.'6 2 Furthermore, the court
noted that Congress can restrict a court's jurisdiction in equity
by
16 3
requiring injunctive relief for certain violations of the law.
Once the court held that the Secretary had violated his statutory
duty to designate a critical habitat for the silvery minnow, it
followed a strict statutory construction of section 706(1).164 Forest
Guardiansstated that "'shall' means shall"'6 5 and that the Supreme
Court had adopted this strict construction approach.16 6 The court
discussed in depth Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt to
demonstrate that courts have found that shall means shall in the
context of the Endangered Species Act.167 The court looked
favorably on the EnvironmentalDefense Centercase, noting that if
it were not for a spending moratorium in place at the time of the
lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit would have been willing to compel
agency action immediately.1 6 8
Forest Guardiansheld that, although courts have discretion to
determine when an agency took an unreasonably long time when
there is no statutory deadline, a statutory deadline strips the court
of discretion. Indeed, the court stated that
when Congress by organic statute sets a specific deadline for
agency action, neither the agency nor any court has discretion.
The agency must act by the deadline. If it withholds such timely
action, a reviewing court must compel the action unlawfully
withheld. To hold otherwise would be an affront to our tradition
160. See id. at 1186-87.
161. Id. at 1187.
162. See id- at 1187-89.
163. See d. at 1187.
164. See id. at 1187-89.
165. Id. at 1187.
166. See id (listing a long line of cases in which the Supreme Court and other circuit
courts have applied a strict statutory construction to the word "shall").
167. See id.
168. See 1d.

1568

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

supremacy
of legislative
69

[Vol. 42:1545

and constitutionally separated

powers.1

With regard to In re BarrLaboratories,the court noted that when
a court deems an action unreasonable or unlawful, it must compel
agency action without a balancing of issues.17 The TRAC factors
are helpful for determining when something is unreasonably
delayed, but are irrelevant when agency action is unlawfully
withheld. 7 1 The court circumvented the problems involved in In re
Barrby deciding that when an agency misses a statutory deadline,
it has unlawfully withheld action, not unreasonably delayed
action. 7 2 Therefore, when an agency misses a statutory deadline,
there is no need to balance TRAC factors because the action is not
unreasonably delayed, but is a violation constituting unlawfully
withheld action.
This case eliminated the need to balance complicated factors
when faced with a statutory deadline. ForestGuardianssimplified
the process by which it decided whether to compel agency action.
The court was comfortable with deciding that it had no discretion
in this matter and stated that section 706(1) "explicitly removed
from the courts the traditional equity balancing that ordinarily
attends decisions whether to issue injunctions," 73 which is
essentially what the APA requires.
COURTS ARE DUTY-BOUND TO COMPEL AGENCIES TO ACT WHEN
AGENCIES Do NOT MEET STATUTORY DEADLINES
What is a court to do when an agency misses a statutory
deadline? Should the court follow the D.C. Circuit and allow the
agency to proceed at its own discretion? Or, should the court compel
the agency to act regardless of the agency's undisputed expertise?
Although there is tension when deciding whether to compel an
agency to act, courts should follow the strict constructionist
jurisprudence advocated by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. The strict
169. Id. at 1190.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 1191.
See id.
See id. at 1190-91.
Id. at 1192.
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constructionist approach, although restrained from evaluating
agency expertise, remains true to congressional intent. It is
important for courts to analyze agency deadlines as law. Once a
court determines that a statutory deadline is "law," the court is
bound to find that delinquent agencies have "unlawfully withheld"
agency action. The statutory construction of the word "shall"
subsequently strips the court of discretion when determining
whether it should compel an agency to act when that agency has
missed a statutory deadline.
Missing Statutory Deadlines Is Unlawfully WithholdingAgency
Action
When an agency misses an explicit statutory deadline, it is
unlawfully withholding action. Statutory deadlines are written into
the legislation of enabling statutes such as the Endangered Species
Act for agencies to follow. When an agency ignores a statutory
deadline, it is not merely unreasonably delaying action. Instead, it
is ignoring the law mandated by Congress. 74 Agencies therefore
should be held to the unlawfully withheld portion of section 706(1)
when ignoring statutory deadlines.
By recognizing that statutory deadlines are "law," and that
missing them is "unlawfully withholding agency action," it is clear
that courts possess no discretion when determining whether to
compel an agency to act. Unlike open-ended deadlines that may be
deemed "unreasonably delayed," statutory deadlines leave no room
for balancing. When Congress enacts a statutory deadline, it strips
the court of the discretion to determine if the deadline is
unreasonable. Refusing to implement congressional laws such as
statutory deadlines is by definition unlawfully withholding action
and is thus not subject to any judicial balancing test, regardless of
intricacy.

174. Black's Law Dictionary defines "law" as "[t]hat which is laid down, ordained, or
established... a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and
having bindinglegal force." BLAC.'s LAWDICTIONARY 884(6th ed. 1990). Statutory deadlines
can thus be characterized as "law" because they are "conduct prescribed by controlling
authority," in this case the authority of Congress.
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The D.C. Circuit Court's continued use of the TRAC factors when
dealing with statutory deadlines is misplaced. Although the TRAC
factors are valuable when dealing with open-ended deadlines to
determine if the inaction is unreasonable, they are not appropriate
when analyzing a statutory deadline. Statutory deadlines are clear
and there is no need for a balancing test. Instead of focusing on the
"unreasonably delayed" portion of section 706(1), courts should
utilize the "unlawfully withheld" language, because refusing to
follow congressional deadlines is unlawful activity.
The D.C. Circuit Court's jurisprudence on section 706(1) and
statutory deadlines is doubly flawed because TRAC eliminates the
need for balancing in the second factor. 7 ' The second TRAC factor
specifically states that Congress may legislate a timetable for
agency action. The need for balancing in the presence of a statutory
deadline is therefore moot. If Congress mandates a statutory
deadline, there is no need to balance the TRAC factors because
Congress has already provided a timetable for agencies. When
Congress creates a statutory deadline, the second TRAC factor is
satisfied, the rule of reason is established, and there is no need for
further balancing.
Shall Means Shall: CourtsMust Compel Agencies to Act When
Statutory DeadlinesAre Involved
An agency's refusal to abide by congressional deadlines must be
compelled without balancing or discretion. In order to determine
congressional intent as to the deadlines, courts first look to the face
of a statute before determining if agencies act reasonably.'76 If the
statutory language is clear, the court need not determine if the
agency's actions are reasonable.'

175. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
176. The Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine if an agency is acting
within its delegated powers. Courts first look to "whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue." Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). The court then determines whether the agency regulation is a
"permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. The Supreme Court put much weight
on statutory construction. See id. at 842-43. In cases where the statutory language is clear,
there is no need to progress to the second step. See id.
177. See id. at 842-44.

20011

MANDATORY AGENCY DEADLINES

1571

Courts shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.'78 If a statute is clear and unambiguous, as
is the case in section 706(1), courts must interpret the statute to
stay true to the congressional purpose. 179 Furthermore,
"laidministrative agencies do not possess the discretion to avoid
discharging the duties that Congress intended them to perform."' 0
Congress did not, however, intend to make courts "super-agencies"
controlling executive branch functions.'"
Congress can restrict the scope of a court's discretion in
determining what action to take. 8 2 Although a court should not
quickly infer that their discretion is limited, they must pay
attention to the statutory language 83 Furthermore, Congress can
limit a court's equitable discretion through statute.'84
The language of section 706(1) is clear. The statute states that a
court shall compel agency action when an agency unlawfully
withholds action. The word "shall" is interpreted strictly and
"indicates a mandatory intent. " 1 5 Congress cannot find stronger
language than "shall."'8 8
Once Congress has indicated a statutory deadline as law, it is not
for the courts to balance factors in determining whether to follow
congressional dictates. 87 Instead, an agency's act of missing a

178. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167,1170 (10th

Cir. 1997).
179. See Mt. Emmons Mining Co., 117 F.3d at 1170 (noting that "no deference is due an
agency interpretation which fails to incorporate the plain meaning ofthe statute").
180. Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir. 1991).
181. See Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 591 (10th Cir. 1984).
182. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982).
183. See id.
184. See id. at 321 (Powell, J., concurring).
185. United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Association of
Civilian Technicians v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 22 F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(stating that "[tihe word 'shall' generally indicates a command that admits no discretion on
the part ofthe person instructed to carry out the directive").
186. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569-70 (1998) (stating that "shall" is
mandatory, not permissive, language); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989)
(noting that "shall" is the strongest language Congress could possibly use).
187. Cf Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,313 (1982) (noting that "Congress
may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion"); Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (noting that courts sometimes have no option but to
issue an injunction).
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statutory deadline is unlawfully withholding action, which must be
treated by compelling agencies to act to implement the legislation.
Courts that hold agency expertise in particularly high esteem,
such as the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, try to find a way to
balance factors in order to grant agencies more discretion. It is
apparent that agencies have an invaluable place in implementing
legislation. Agencies include teams of experts who are trained to
determine which projects must be attended to first. Furthermore,
expertise allows agencies to have a more comprehensive
understanding than Congress of many important issues. Although
agencies are very important in their ability to prioritize and
understand complexissues, they must remain loyal to congressional
mandates. Even though it is tempting to grant agencies broad
discretion to determine when particular legislation should be
implemented, circumventing mandatory statutory deadlines
through balancing schemes should not be allowed. The agency
might have a more comprehensive understanding of a complex
scientific issue than Congress possesses. The agency, however, is
still subordinate to congressional will. The temptation to allow
agencies discretion in the face of statutory deadlines is strong
because agencies have added expertise. Yet, courts must not yield
to this temptation because agency expertise cannot trump the plain
language of a statute such as the APA.
Instead of allowing agencies to substitute their admittedly expert
guidelines for congressional mandates, courts should recognize that
there are other options that place the proper amount of importance
on agency expertise. Agencies are capable of communicating with
Congress without disobeying clear congressional intent. When an
agency is incapable of reaching a deadline because of financial
constraints or workload, the agency should communicate the
problem to Congress before simply ignoring the law. Furthermore,
ifan agency finds that a congressional mandate is inconsistent with
scientific reality, the agency could inform Congress of the problem
and attempt to find a solution. Although this approach may not be
the most efficient proposal, it avoids the problem of agencies
running amok, refusing to follow congressional enactments.
When an agency misses a statutory deadline, it has unlawfully
withheld action. There is no need for judicial discretion in such a
case because there is clear law to apply. An agency's refusal to
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follow congressional timetables is thus untouched by balancing and
discretion. Courts simply must compel an agency to act when there
is a specific deadline set by Congress.
CONCLUSION

Statutory deadlines are classified as law. When an agency misses
such a deadline, it has unlawfully withheld action. Therefore, the
reviewing court has no choice but to compel agency action in cases
of statutory deadlines.
Courts may excuse agencies for missing deadlines only if
compliance is fiscally impossible. When Congress passes spending
moratoria, the agency has no option but to remain silent. Therefore,
such congressional actions relieve the agency from acting until
funding is available again.
Agencies are not without relief under this construct. They can
petition Congress to get more time or funds to complete the
regulations. Agencies cannot, however, simply avoid the words of
Congress when administrating regulations. Agencies owe their
existence to Congress and are thus beholden to Congress. Agencies
must learn to interact more freely with their creator.
Agencies are not the sole source of the problems that plague the
administrative state. Congress must acknowledge the limitations
of agencies and provide means by which agencies can effectuate
congressional purpose. Perhaps the steady stream of missed
deadlines may act as the proverbial canary to indicate the
overburdened level of agency mandates, thus motivating Congress
to rethink its methods of delegation.
CatherineZaller

